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OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
Physicians and Surgeons: Hospital Liability for
Emergency Room Treatment: Is the Ostensible Agency
Doctrine Viable in Oklahoma?
Traditionally, emergency rooms treated only "true" emergencies involving
accident victims, suicidal persons, victims of fires or other disasters, and per-
sons suffering heart attacks.' Patients now look to hospital emergency
facilities as outpatient and backup centers that provide convenient treatment
of nonemergent illnesses as well as conditions requiring immediate care. 2
Those who come to hospital emergency rooms probably give no thought to
whether treatment is given by agents/employees of the hospital or by staff
physicians who are considered to be independent contractors. These patients
most likely assume that all who work in the emergency room are agents of
the hospital. In light of these expectations, courts have begun to apply the
apparent or ostensible agency rule to create vicarious liability where it ap-
pears that the hospital is offering particular physician services.3
This note discusses the general expansion of hospital liability in the
emergency room context through the application of the ostensible or ap-
parent agency doctrine. The doctrine allows a hospital to be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of independent contractor physicians and other
medical personnel who staff emergency rooms. Courts will consider the
following factors in determining whether an ostensible agency exists: (1)
whether the emergency room patient had a preexisting relationship with the
treating physician; (2) whether the physician was an independent contractor;
(3) whether the patient, at the time of his admission to the hospital, looked
primarily to the hospital for treatment; and (4) whether the patient
reasonably relied on the hospital's representation that the treating physician
was acting on behalf of the hospital.
4
This note analyzes the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Weldon v. Seminole Municipal Hospital.s In Weldon the supreme court took
1. HosPrrAL LIABIuy LAW AND TACTICS 592 (M. Bertolet & L. Goldsmith eds. 4th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter HOSPITAL LIABILITY LAW].
2. Id. For the purpose of this note, the term "hospital" means
any institution, place, building or agency, public or private, whether organized for
profit or not, devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
the diagnosis, treatment or care of patients admitted for overnight stay or longer in
order to obtain medical care, surgical care, obstetrical care, or nursing care for ill-
ness, disea';e, injury, infirmity, or deformity.
See 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-701 (1981). A physician is one who is licensed to treat disease or injury.
59 OKLA. STAT. § 492 (1981). See also 59 OKLA. STAT. § 725.2 (1981) (designating who can use
the word "doctor").
3. Principles of Hospital Liability, in 2B HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL 1, 50 (P. Lasky ed. 1986)
[hereinafter Principles of Hospital Liability].
4. See, e.g., Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Mich. 1978); Hardy
v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279,
282 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970,
975 (1978).
5. 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985). The court recognized the doctrine of apparent agency as set
out in Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
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a restrictive view of the ostensible agency doctrine and refused to extend the
liability of a hospital for the acts of emergency room physicians who were in-
dependent contractors. The critical factor on which the supreme court's deci-
sion turned was the preexisting relationship between the doctor and the pa-
tient who sought treatment from the hospital emergency room.
After careful consideration of the central issues, this note concludes that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court should not impose restrictions that prevent the
application of the ostensible agency doctrine. Even when the patient is
treated by his own physician, there are still instances when a hospital should
be liable for the physician's negligence. Certainly, when a patient looks to a
hospital for treatment in reliance on the hospital's representation to the
public that it does provide such care, courts should look to principles of
agency in determining liability. Consideration of whether ostensible agency
applies outside the emergency room context is beyond the scope of this note.
Emergency Care in General
Emergency Defined
A hospital emergency department typically has a high-pressure atmosphere
that rarely allows time for leisurely diagnosis and consultation. The emer-
gency physician is periodically stressed by a steady flow of patients, all of
whom want immediate treatment and who bring with them varying numbers
of emotionally strained family members and friends.6
The American Hospital Association (AHA) defines an emergency as any
condition that requires immediate medical attention, whether in the opinion
of the patient or whoever assumes the responsibility of bringing the patient to
the hospital. A true emergency is one that has been clinically determined to
require immediate medical care. A true emergency may be classified as
emergent, a condition that is acute and potentially life threatening; or it may
be classified as urgent, a condition that is acute but not necessarily severe. A
condition that does not require the resources of an emergency service is
classified as nonurgent.
7
Statistics indicate that in 1984 the number of emergency room visits was
approximately 160 million compared with 35,729,801 visits in 1968.1 Reasons
advanced for this marked increase in the use of emergency departments in-
clude: (1) the decrease in the number of general practitioners of medicine; (2)
the around-the-clock availability of service provided by emergency rooms; and (3)
the general public's perception of the emergency room as a neighborhood
health center. 9
A study of the reasons persons seek emergency care reveals that physicians
and patients have differing concepts of emergency.1" Complaints presented
6. J. GEORGE, LAW AND EMERGENCY CARE at v, (1980).
7. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, EMERGENCY CARE AND THE LAW 44-45 (1981).
8. Id. at 43.
9. Id.




by patients or their medical history have been classified as: poisoning, "dead
on arrival," fractures, minor or major burns, abrasions, contusions, lacera-
tions, respiratory infection, skin disease, and psychosomatic problems." The
variety and complexity of complaints coupled with the emotionally charged
and stressful conditions under which medical help is provided demand that a
hospital provide adequate service through its emergency staff to avoid liabil-
ity for injuries to patients.
Emergency Departments and Their Responsibility to Treat
At common law, no duty exists to treat another in peril.' 2 This doctrine
has been applied to physicians and to hospitals as well as to lay persons."
Private hospitals may set their own admissions criteria on nondiscriminatory
grounds.' F[owever, obtaining federal assistance under the Hill-Burton Act
requires that a certain volume of service be provided to persons unable to
pay.i
Although the common law does not impose a duty upon a general hospital
to provide treatment and care for emergency patients, a few states have
statutory laws that either directly or indirectly require some hospitals to
render emergency care.' 6 These statutes are an apparent attempt to meet
public expectations that every community should provide ready and conven-
ient access to a hospital emergency department. Precedential cases in some
jurisdictions have held that hospitals that maintain emergency facilities must
assist a person who comes for treatment when that person has relied on some
11. Id. at 5:36.
12. See Huiley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901). The American Medical
Association (AMA) recognizes the physician's right to choose his patients. In an emergency,
however, a physician should render service to the best of his ability. CODE OF ETHICS § 5
(Americal Medical Ass'n).
13. Annotation, Liability of Hospital for Refusal to Admit Or Treat Patient, 35 A.L.R.3d
841 (1971).
14. 25 OKtA. STAT. § 1402 (Supp. 1985) provides: "It is a discriminatory practice for a per-
son to deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap."
15. "A place of public accommodation" is statutorily defined as "one which is, among
other things, supported directly or indirectly by government funds." 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1401
(Supp. 1985).
16. A. SOUTHWICK, LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 184 (1978). See 63
OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-701 through 1-741 (1981) (regulations affecting general hospitals). The
Oklahoma statutes do not appear to expressly place an affirmative duty on general hospitals to
maintain an emergency room. However, the term "general hospital" means a hospital main-
tained for the purpose of providing hospital care in a broad category of illness and injury. Id. §
1-701(a)(1).
63 OKLA. STAT. § 330.71 (1981) recognizes the need for emergency medical care. This legisla-
tion, however, refers to emergency assistance given by hospital ancillary facilities or ambulance
services prior to treatment by the regular hospital staff. The Hill-Burton Act (Hospital Survey
and Construction Act of 1946) states that a public or a private hospital receiving Hill-Burton
funds may not refuse emergency care or hospital admission on the basis of race, color, creed, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 291j (1982).
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public representation by the hospital that emergency care is available.17 These
cases also suggest that the physician has a duty to examine the patient to
determine whether an emergency exists.' 8
Once the hospital emergency staff begins to aid a patient, the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care under the circumstances applies.' 9 A doctor-patient rela-
tionship exists and the patient must be examined, his condition diagnosed by
the treating physician, and follow-up care provided to avoid liability for
abandonment. "°
In an effort to induce physicians to render aid at accidents, many states
have enacted "Good Samaritan" laws.2 ' These laws all attempt to eliminate
recovery of damages for ordinary negligence in the course of medical treat-
ment at the scene of an accident. Relatively few courts have considered the
application of such statutes to health care personnel within a hospital
setting. 22 These courts have not extended the protection of Good Samaritan
statutes to physicians who are members of the hospital's emergency panel.
Consent to Treatment
The general principles of consent to medical treatment are applicable in all
situations involving medical care.23 In cases of genuine emergency, such as
17. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961) (trial court
concluded that even though a private hospital had no common law duty to treat any patient, the
hospital did have a duty to give treatment in an emergency case if the patient had relied upon a
well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case). See also Guerrero v. Copper
Queen Hosp., 22 Ariz. App. 611, 529 P.2d 1205 (1974) (private hospital which held out its
emergency treatment facilities to the community could not refuse to aid patients requesting care),
vacated 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
18. See cases cited supra note 17.
19. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emer. Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975) (ad-
vances in the profession, availability of special facilities, etc., will be taken into account). The
standard to be applied in an emergency is that degree of skill, care, and knowledge that the
average practitioner would use under the circumstances imposed by the emergency. In
Oklahoma, the hospital "must exercise such care and caution for the patient's safety as the pa-
tient's mental and physical condition, as known or should be known to the hospital authorities
and employees may require." Tulsa Hosp. Assoc. v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 P. 519, 523 (1918).
See also Annotation, Locality Rule as Governing Hospital's Standard of Care to Patient and Ex-
pert's Competency to Testify Thereto, 36 A.L.R.3d 440 (1971).
20. Since a physician has no duty to treat, commencement of actual treatment imposes a
contract and a duty upon the physician to follow through. See Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630,
239 S.E.2d 103 (1977).
21. 76 OKLA. STAT. §§ 5-5.7 (1981). The Oklahoma "Good Samaritan" Act exempts those
who give aid under emergency circumstances "except for committing gross negligence or willful
or wanton wrongs in rendering the emergency care." Id. § 5(c)(2).
22. See McKenna v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 282, 155 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1979) (extended the statute to a resident who was not a member of the emergency team). But cf.
Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975) (held that the medical ex-
pertise of a hospital is assumed and the Good Samaritan statute did not apply).
23. Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984) (failure to disclose alternative treatments gave
rise to liability under informed consent); Masquat v. MacGuire, 638 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1981)
(failure to inform patient of different methods of treatment did not vitiate consent); Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1980) (Oklahoma officially adopted the doctrine of informed
consent).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/10
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when a patient is unconscious or sufficiently ill to be unable to comprehend,
the physician may give necessary treatment without attempting to explain or
to inform the patient of risks.24 This so-called "emergency doctrine" is
limited to situations that require immediate action for the preservation of life
or health of a patient.
Hospital Liability in the Emergency Room Context: Theories of Recovery
Historically, courts have perceived hospitals as being much like innkeepers,
but providing quarters in which patients could receive care and treatment
from a privately selected physician. 25 Moreover, the courts emphasized that
hospitals, unlike physicians, were not licensed to practice and, therefore,
could not be held liable for deficiencies in medical treatment. Determination
of a hospital's liability was limited to an evaluation of the facilities and the
support staff.
The courts' rationale for refusing to impose liability on hospitals was that
a hospital has no control over medical decision making. Physicians, because
of their skill and training in a highly technical field, were not properly sub-
ject to the control of hospital lay boards. Therefore, hospitals were deemed
responsible for only the administrative aspects of treatment, even where
physicians were employees. 6 There has been a steady erosion of this narrow
view of hospitals' liability, and courts have begun to broaden the scope of
hospitals' responsibility for the quality of medical care.
Corporate Liability: The Hospital's Duty to
Monitor Physician Activities
As governmental and charitable immunity for hospitals begins to diminish,
hospitals' negligence liability is increasing.2 7 An evolving view of hospital
24. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
This is the classic case that explains the informed consent doctrine. The court recognized two ex-
ceptions-emergency treatment and therapeutic privilege (disclosure might harm the patient).
464 F.2d at 788-89. In Oklahoma the Good Samaritan Act provides that exemption from liability
will not attach -f the adult victim is conscious and capable of giving or refusing his consent; or if
the victim's spouse, parent, or guardian can be reached in a reasonable time. 76 OKLA. STAT. §
5(a)(3) (1981). See also 59 OKLA. STAT. § 518 (1981) (no liability will attach to a licensed practi-
tioner of a healing art for treatment of a minor without consent of a parent or guardian when
such treatment was performed in an emergency and in good faith).
25. Principles of Hospital Liability, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
26. See Southvick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its
Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429 (1973); Note, Torts: The Expan-
ding Liability of Hospitals, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 441 (1973); Note, Agency: Liability of a Hospital
for Negligent Acts of a Physician-Employee, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 77 (1965). Comment, The
Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50
WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975).
27. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (1944). In the absence of statutory provisions, a hospital existing
for governmental purposes is not liable for the negligence of its employees. Oklahoma has
adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity for the state, its political subdivisions, and all
employees acting within the scope of employment, whether performing governmental or pro-
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
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liability is that a hospital may be liable as a corporation to a patient for in-
juries suffered as the result of negligent treatment by a staff physician.28 The
hospital is said to have breached its independent duty of care to patients
receiving treatment. Plaintiffs will generally sue both the hospital and the
staff physician. Liability of hospitals based on a theory of corporate
negligence has received limited acceptance but remains a source of continued
litigation.
Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital" is the most frequently cited
case that suggests a hospital owes a nondelegable duty to a patient who is
treated by hospital emergency room staff. In Darling, an Illinois case, a
hospital was held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of an indepen-
dent staff physician. The plaintiff broke his leg while playing in a college
football game. He was taken to the defendant hospital's emergency room
where he was treated by a staff physician on emergency call °. 3 An infection
prietary functions. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1 (Supp. 1985). See State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Welfare
v. Martin, 570 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977) (operation of a children's hospital by the State Department
of Public Welfare was a function of the state, and the doctrine of governmental immunity was
applicable to bar action for damages for malpractice against hospital). But see 51 OKLA. STAT. §
153 (Supp. 1985) which provides:
The state or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or
the torts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment subject to
the limitations and exceptions specified in the act, and only where the state or
political subdivision, if a private person or entity, would be liable for money
damages under the laws of this state.
See also Hershel v. University Hosp. Found., 610 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1980), overruling 570 P.2d
623 (Okla. 1977) (operation of state university hospital was a "proprietary function" exercised
by the state for which the state was not immune from liability for tortious conduct arising
therefrom). A private hospital that is not a charity is liable for damages arising from its
negligence or from the negligence of its agents or servants. Charitable immunity has generally
been abandoned in the United States. Courts now believe that such institutions should be liable
for negligence just like other businesses. The courts also assume that such hospitals can purchase
liability insurance. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (1944).
28. Annotation, Hospital's Liability for Negligence in Failing to Review or Supervise Treat-
ment Given by Doctor, or to Require Consultation, 12 A.L.R.4th 57 (1982); Darling v.
Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 946 (1966) (hospital had a duty to protect patients from negligent care); Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hosp., 97 Wis. 2d 521, 294 N.W.2d 501 (1980), aff'd, 99 Wis. 2d 708,
301 N.W.2d 156 (1981) (hospital liable for a physician's incompetency that could have been
discovered had reasonable effort been made in evaluating his credentials). See also Fridena v.
Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332,
183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982) (hospitals have a continuing duty to ensure competence of those on its
medical staff through review and supervision of physicians). But see Pedroza v. Bryant, 101
Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984) (hospital's liability extends only to acts committed by a
physician within the hospital).
29. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
30. Id., 211 N.E.2d at 258. In Oklahoma, hospital rules, regulations, and standards are
established by statute. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-707 (1981). 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-707(b) requires
establishment of criteria for granting staff privileges. See Rogers v. Baptist Gen. Conv., 651
P.2d 672 (Okla. 1982). See also Warner v. Kiowa County Hosp. Auth., 551 P.2d 1179 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1976) (one cannot operate a hospital without obtaining a license from the State Commis-
1987]
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developed due to an improper application of the plaster cast. The plaintiff
complained of severe pain and the nurses noted that the plaintiff's toes were
swollen and dark. Eventually, the patient's leg had to be amputated.
The plaintiff brought an action against both the physician and the
hospital, contending that the hospital was negligent because it failed to exer-
cise adequate supervision over the physician; it allowed an unqualified physi-
cian to perForm orthopedic surgery; and it failed to require consultation. In
finding the hospital negligent, the trial court relied on evidence of the
medical bylaws of the hospital and the Illinois licensing and accreditation
standards. This evidence performed much the same function as custom in
determining what constituted reasonable care under the circumstances. The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision and noted that the
hospital had a duty to adequately monitor the physician's activities to ensure
quality care for its patients'.
3
The Darling decision was one of the first to enunciate what has come to be
called the doctrine of corporate responsibility.32 This doctrine recognizes the
existence of a duty owed directly by a hospital to a patient in connection with
the care and treatment given to him. A hospital may be independently liable
for failing to review or supervise treatment provided by a doctor or to require
a consultation.
This expansion of hospital liability beyond the traditional theory of
respondeat superior or the rules of charitable or governmental immunity is
based on the changing role of modern hospitals. Hospitals now play an active
role in supplying and supervising the purely medical care a patient receives.
Independent physicians who are members of the hospital staff are subject to
review and are required to comply with hospital standards. Consequently,
even in the absence of an employee or agency relationship with the negligent
doctor, the corporate negligence theory would impose direct liability on the
hospital for failure to review or to supervise treatment.
3
Premises Liability: The Hospital's Duty to a Patient/Invitee
Distinguishable from Darling corporate negligence situations, are the
premises of liability actions under which a hospital has traditionally been
sioner of Health and complying with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the State
Board of Health, which are designed to require at least minimum professional proficiency in
terms of patient care and protection).
In many instances, minimum national standards for hospital accreditation are set by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Commission enforces standards in
hospital care and administration. The Commission also recommends that medical staff commit-
tees regularly review the competence of staff members with the intention of instituting
disciplinary action when necessary. W. WADLINGTON, J. WALTZ & R. DWORKIN, LAW AND
MEDICINE 203 (1980).
31. Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 258
(1965).
32. See Annctation, Hospital's Liability for Negligence in Failing to Review or Supervise
Treatment Given by Doctor, or to Require Consultation, 12 A.L.R.4th 57 (1982).
33. Id.
[Vol. 40
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held liable. These actions differ from ordinary malpractice suits because they
generally do not involve negligent treatment but are based on the hospital's
liability as owner or operator of the facility. A patient who comes to the
hospital for treatment occupies the legal status of an invitee. An invitee is
one who is invited or permitted to enter and remain on the premises for the
occupier's purpose. 3 The hospital owes a legal duty of care to the patient to
make the premises safe from dangerous conditions or activities of which the
hospital should reasonably be aware.
A hospital as a business entity is required to install equipment safely and to
inspect equipment at regular intervals. A hospital is also responsible for
maintaining the condition of the premises to prevent falls and other kinds of
accidents. The care expected of a hospital in regard to its premises is deter-
mined by a patient's ability to look after himself, and hospital personnel are
held to assume that persons of all levels of physical and emotional ability
may use the facilities."
Vicarious Liability: The Hospital as the Physician's Principal
Another theory upon which hospital liability for injuries occurring in the
emergency room context can be based is that of vicarious liability. Vicarious
liability is an umbrella doctrine that involves the responsibility of one who is
not negligent for the negligence of another.36 In these situations, the hospital
as an institution may be held liable along with the person whose negligence
gave rise to the cause of action.
Hospitals are generally liable under agency principles for negligence of
their employees or other agents who cause injuries in the course of their
duties under the theory of respondeat superior. Respondeat superior is a
form of vicarious liability based on an employment or agency relationship.
37
Usually the doctrine will be available where an employment relationship ex-
ists. In order to recover, the plaintiff must show that the employee did not
act beyond the scope of his employment and that the employer had the right
to control the actions of the employee.
38
The difficulty lies in defining "employment," and courts have identified a
variety of factors, which, taken alone or jointly, solidify the relationship of
employer/employee. 3' Another problem area is determining whether the
34. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 174 (1978).
35. Id. at 190. See also Perdue, Direct Corporate Liability of Hospitals: A Modern Day
Legal Concept of Liability for Injury Occurring in the Modern Day Hospital, 24 S. TEx. L.J.
773 (1983).
36. 57 C.J.S. Master/Servant §§ 555-621 (1973).
37. Id. § 561.
38. Id. § 562.
39. Factors used to determine whether there exists an employment relationship will vary
from case to case. The issue has turned on several factors. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen.
Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) (court found an employment relationship where
hospital had legal right to control the performance of medical staff; where hospital provided
space, equipment, and technical personnel; where hospital acted as billing agent for medical
1987]
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employer has the right to control the employee's conduct. In an effort to
avoid liability by placing the responsibility of supervision on the treating
physician, hospitals may attempt to show that an employee has become a
"borrowed servant" of the staff physician even though still employed by the
hospital.
40
Under the traditional theory of agency, for the hospital to be liable for a
physician's malpractice in the emergency room, the hospital must have some
control over the work performed. A physician's membership on the
hospital's medical staff alone would not be sufficient to impose liability.4
Contract physicians who take care of emergency patients at a hospital
generally do not impose liability on the hospital if the hospital has no right to
control the techniques used by the doctor."'
Whether the hospital has exercised sufficient control over the emergency
room physician is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each
case. There i3, however, an emerging trend to expand the definition of
employer/employee to include those independent contractors who would not
traditionally be found to be in such a relationship. This is true despite the
provisions in contracts between the hospital and contracting emergency room
physicians designed to negate the hospital's control over treatment
decisions. 3 Another manifestation of the trend to expand hospital liability is
group; and where the patient had no control over selection of physician/radiologist); Overstreet
v. Doctor's Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977) (per contract provision, the hospital
would exercise no control over emergency room); Hodges v. Doctors Hosp., 141 Ga. App. 649,
234 S.E.2d 116 (1977) (inquiry should focus on the hospital's right under a contract to control
the time, manner, and method of the work that the physician performs).
40. See Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103 (1977) (describing the doctrine of
borrowed servant and wrestling with the idea of control). See also Turney v. Anspaugh, 581
P.2d 1301, 1306 (Okla. 1978) (an instruction suggesting that if the negligent nurses and techni-
cians were acting for the mutual benefit of the defendant hospital and the defendant physician,
then the plaintiff might have a cause of action against both defendants, fairly instructed the jury
on the applicable law); Hull v. Enid Gen. Hosp. Found., 194 Okla. 446, 152 P.2d 693 (1944)
(x-ray technicians employed by the hospital, but controlled by the doctor as to treatments, were
determined to be loaned servants even though the hospital received part of the fee for the treat-
ment); McCowen v. Sisters of Most Precious Blood of Enid, 208 Okla. 130, 253 P.2d 830 (1953)
(it was error to direct a verdict for the hospital in a negligence case where an issue of fact existed
concerning whether the staff surgeon exercised actual control of the operating room nurse).
41. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, supra note 7, at 211. See also Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) (applying the principle of respondeat superior to the
negligent acts of employed medical doctors and holding that the hospital was subject to liability
for salaried doctors just as for other employees of the hospital).
42. Pogue v. Hosp. Auth. of DeKalb County, 120 Ga. App. 230, 170 S.E.2d 53 (1969) (after
examining the contract between the hospital and the physician, the court determined that the
agreement expressly designated the physician as an independent contractor).
43. Hollingsworth v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 145 Ga. App. 870, 245 S.E.2d 60 (1978),
aff'd, 242 Ga. 522, 250 S.E.2d 433 (1978) (appellate court held that an oral contract between a
hospital and a plhysician for provision of emergency room services created a question of fact
concerning whether the doctor was an employee or an independent contractor). Cf. Mehlman v.
Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977) (in applying an apparent agent theory, the court
stressed the hospital's control over independently contracted emergency room physicians by vir-
[Vol. 40
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to find ostensible agency where the facts do not support either a corporate
negligence or employer/employee basis for holding the hospital responsible.
Ostensible Agency in the Emergency Room
Hospitals have a variety of methods to provide physician availability for
the emergency room. One method is for the hospital to employ the physician;
a second requires members of the hospital medical staff to work on a
rotating basis. The most common method is a contractual agreement between
the hospital and an independent physician group." In the contractual ar-
rangement, the physician group is generally paid a set sum for its ad-
ministrative services; fees for professional services may be billed to the pa-
tient or to a third party. The hospital does not divest itself of the responsibil-
ity to provide quality care, no matter which of the emergency room staffing
methods is utilized.
There are two types of agency relationships that may be used by a plaintiff
to impose liability on a defendant hospital for the negligence of its staff: (a)
actual agency and (b) apparent or ostensible agency." An actual agency rela-
tionship is created as the result of an agreement between two parties that in-
dicates that one of them (the principal) is willing for the other (the agent) to
act for him subject to the principal's control." For example, an actual
agency relationship exists where a hospital and a physician enter into a con-
tract where the agreement provides that the hospital will pay the physician a
salary if the physician will treat the patients who seek emergency room care.
In this case, since the physician is an actual agent of the hospital, the hospital
can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the physician/employee.
Entirely distinct from actual agency is an apparent or ostensible agency.
Here, the principal manifests to a third party that another is his agent, even
though the agent is not employed by the principal. 7 This form of agency ex-
tue of admitting procedures, billing processes, and facility regulations); Mduba v. Benedictine
Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976) (appellate court held a hospital responsible for
the negligence of a physician who operated its emergency room on a contract basis, notwith-
standing the actual contract between physician and hospital designating the physician as an in-
dependent contractor).
44. Admitting and Discharge, in 1 HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL 32 (P. Lasky ed. 1980).
45. 3 AM. JUR. 2d, Agency §§ 73-77 (1986).
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 8 (1958). See also id. § 267 which provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a
third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is sub-
ject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of
the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
In Oklahoma, the ostensible agency doctrine has been applied in two recent cases: Weldon v.
Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985) and Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676
P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983). The ostensible agency principle has also been applied in other
jurisdictions. See Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.
2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Vanaman v. Milford Mem. Hosp., Inc., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970);




ists when the hospital does not directly employ the physicians who work in
the emergency room but contracts with an outside company to provide the
staff. If the patient seeks treatment primarily from the hospital emergency
room staff and the hospital allows the patient to assume that the treating
physician is acting on the hospital's behalf, an ostensible agency is created.
In order for the apparent agency doctrine to apply, the plaintiff must
establish:
(1) that the [principal] has manifested its consent to the exercise of
such authority [to act as an agent] or has knowingly permitted the
[agent] to assume the exercise of such authority: (2) that the [third
person] knew of the facts and, acting in good faith, had a reason
to believe and did believe that the [agent] possessed such author-
ity; and (3) that the [third person], relying on such appearance of
authority, has changed his position and will be injured or suffer
loss if the act done by the agent does not bind the principal.4 8
A physician who has hospital staff privileges or the physician group under
contract to manage the emergency department would not be considered
employees of the hospital under the traditional approach to negligence ac-
tions. Courts have looked to the contract itself for evidence that the physi-
cian is an independent contractor. Other courts have determined that a
hospital is riot able to control the physician's independent medical
judgment.49 Some courts, however, are beginning to realize that physicians
tors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982); Paintsville Hosp. Co. v.
Rose, 683 SAV.2d 255 (Ky. 1985); Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977);
Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972); Hardy v. Brantley, M.D., 471 So.
2d 358 (Miss. 1985); Kober v. Stewart, 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476 (1966); Arthur v. St. Peters
Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450,
384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187
(1980); Lundberg v. Bayview Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963); Themins v.
Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 54 Or. App. 901, 637 P.2d 155 (1981); Capan v. Divine Pro-
vidence Hosp., 287 Pa. Super. 364, 430 A.2d 647 (1980); Edmonds v. Chamberlain Mem.
Hosp., 629 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. App. 1981); Brownsville Med. Center v. Gracia, 704 S.W.2d 68
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
But see Trapp v. Cayson, 471 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1985) (distinguished from Hardy v. Brantley,
M.D., 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985) (staff physician on call and available to render radiologic
services not ostensible agent of hospital where the only control the hospital has over physician is
through credentials process and audits of the work of the department); Felice v. St. Agnes
Hosp., 65 A.D.2d 388, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978) (distinguished an ostensible agency situation
from one in which a patient retains his own private physician to treat him at the hospital). See
generally Levin, Hospital's Liability for Independent Emergency Room Service, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 791 (1982); Note, Theories for Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals for Medical
Malpractice: Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 561 (1985);
Note, Medical Malpractice-Ostensible Agency and Corporate Negligence-Hospital Liability
May be Based on Either Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Doctrine of Corporate Negligence, 17
ST. MARY'S L.J. 551 (1986).
48. 3 AM..JUR. 2d Agency § 80 (1986).
49. Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1970) (where patient was examined by an
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who work in the emergency room are employees of the hospitals, at least in
the public mind. The physician is seen as an agent of the hospital even
though he is an independent contractor. This theory for holding hospitals
liable for the negligence of physicians or medical groups who run the
emergency department is the apparent or ostensible agency concept.5 0
Apparent agency authority results from statements, conduct, or other
manifestations of the hospital's consent whereby a patient is justified in
believing that the emergency room physician is acting as an agent or
employee." The hospital is bound by the acts of the physician acting within
the scope of his authority if the patient, in good faith, deals with the physi-
cian and relies on the skill of the physician.2 A hospital may vest the
emergency room physician with apparent authority by omission as well as
commission.3 If the hospital allows an ostensible agency relationship to be
formed, the hospital has an affirmative duty to correct an erroneous impres-
sion. 4 Moreover, the doctrine of apparent authority may not be invoked by
a patient who knows the limits and extent of a physician's authority. 5I
Some courts that have applied the ostensible agency doctrine to emergency
room cases have held that it was a question for the jury to decide whether the
hospital was holding out or representing the defendant physician to be an
agent.5 6 In Adamski v. Tacoma General Hospital, a patient treated in a
hospital's emergency room brought a medical malpractice action against the
hospital. The trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary judg-
emergency room physician who failed to diagnose fractured vertabrae, the court dismissed the
case against the hospital because the physician was an independent contractor by terms of an
agreement). See also Overstreet v. Doctor's Hosp., 147 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977)
(Court declined to find an emergency room physician to be an employee despite scheduling, bill-
ing, and other control features of the agreement between the physician and hospital; whether the
hospital exercises control over the physician is a question of fact.); Pogue v. Hospital Auth., 120
Ga. App. 230, 170 S.E.2d 53 (1969).
50. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency §§ 78-81 (1986). See, e.g., Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683
S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983). But see
Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1985); Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp.,
709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985); Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Respon-
sibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975).
51. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency §§ 78-81 (1986). See Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404
Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429 (1978) (physician was ostensible agent of the hospital because the
patient did not have a patient/physician relationship with the physician independent of the
hospital setting and no notice was given to the patient that the physician was an independent
contractor).
52. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 81 (1986). The terms "apparent authority" and "agency by
estoppel" are equivalent. Stated in terms of estoppel, the rule is that where a principal has, by
his voluntary act, placed an agent in such a situation that a third person is justified in assuming
that such agent has authority to perform a particular act and deals with the agent upon that
assumption, the principal is estopped from denying the agent's authority. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 79.
55. Id.
56. Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
19871
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ment on grounds that the treating physician was an independent contractor
and not a paid employee of the hospital.
7
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to
the trial court because a material issue of fact existed as to whether the
emergency room physician who treated the patient was an agent of the
hospital." The court, in reaching its decision, stated that:
[A] jury could find that Tacoma General held itself out as pro-
viding; emergency care service to the public. A jury could find that
the plaintiff reasonably believed Dr. Tsoi was employed by the
Hospital to deliver that emergency room service. It appears plain-
tiff was not advised to the contrary and, in fact, he believed he
was being treated by the Hospital's agent. 9
In Arthur v. St. Peter's Hospital,6 the Superior Court of New Jersey took
judicial no:tice of the fact that "generally people who seek medical help
through the emergency room facilities of modern-day hospitals are unaware
of the status of the various professionals working there.'", The court denied
the defendant hospital's motion for summary judgment and cited several fac-
tors that might be considered in determining whether an ostensible agency ex-
isted: (1) whether the patient makes an independent selection of his physi-
cian; and (2) whether the patient is in some way put on notice of the independent
status of the professionals with whom he comes into contact.62
The degree of the patient's involvement in the selection of his emergency
room physician was seen as an important criterion in Grewe v. Mt. Clemens
General Hospital. 6
In our view, the critical question is whether the plaintiff, at the
time of his admission to the hospital, was looking to the hospital
57. Id. In Adamski, the plaintiff injured his finger while playing baseball and later went to
defendant hospital's emergency room for treatment. The physician in charge, Dr. Tsoi, treated
and sutured the wound and told the plaintiff to consult with his personal physician for removal
of the sutures in dve to six days. The plaintiff was also given a hospital form that stated if plain-
tiff was unab2e to contact his personal physician he should feel free to contact the emergency
department at th. hospital. Id. at 972. When his finger became swollen the next day, plaintiff
called the emergency room for advice and claimed he was told by the nurse that the pain and
swelling were not unusual. The next day plaintiff contacted the hospital and was told the same
thing and that he should see his personal physician. Id. at 972. Plaintiff tried to contact another
physician who had treated him in the past but was referred to another hospital emergency room,
where he was examined and referred to a private physician, Dr. Hirz. Dr. Hirz admitted the
plaintiff to Lakewood Hospital and later surgically opened the injured finger and drained the
wound. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 979. But see Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1984). A mere
subjective assertion of reliance by a third party is not enough to create an ostensible agency
because it mu;t be judged within objective constraints. Id. at 674.
60. 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979).
61. Id., 405 A.2d at 447.
62. Id.
63. 404 Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429 (1978).
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for treatment of his physical ailments or merely viewed the
hospital as the situs where his physician would treat him for his
problems. A relevant factor in this determination involves resolu-
tion of the question of whether the hospital provided the plaintiff
with Dr. Katzowitz or whether the plaintiff and Dr. Katzowitz
had a patient-physician relationship independent of the hospital
setting.
64
The court concluded that even in situations where medical personnel are
independent contractors, the hospital can be held liable for the negligence of
such personnel who are performing medical services ordinarily performed by
the hospital.6 5 The court stated that evidence presented at trial indicated that
the plaintiff was seeking treatment from the hospital itself. There was no
record of any preexisting patient-physician relationship with any of the
medical personnel who treated the plaintiff. Consequently, the court upheld
a jury verdict against defendant hospital based on the ostensible agency doc-
trine.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed a decision by the trial court in favor
of a hospital and the city of Lakewood where a patient died after receiving
treatment in the emergency room.6 6 The court refused to allow a full-service
hospital to "contractually insulate itself" from liability for acts of medical
malpractice committed in its emergency room.67 This was true even though
the emergency room was operated by a third party based on a contractual
agreement. The court stated that the hospital would be estopped to deny that
physicians and other medical personnel on duty are its agents because the
hospital purported to make emergency room treatment available to the
public. This decision is in direct conflict with the traditional view that a
hospital cannot be held liable for the negligent acts of independent contractor
physicians.
In summary, the patient's reasonable expectations and reliance that
emergency room professionals act on behalf of the hospital have influenced
some courts to impose liability on hospitals for the negligence of independent
contractors. The theory of apparent or ostensible agency creates vicarious
liability where it appears that the hospital holds itself out as offering par-
ticular physician services such as emergency treatment even when the services
are performed by physicians who are not paid by the hospital.
64. Id., 273 N.W.2d at 433.
65. Id., 273 N.W.2d at 435.
66. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
67. Id., 426 N.E.2d at 1190. See also Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 384
N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976) (notwithstanding the actual contract between a physician and a hospital, the
hospital exercised enough control over the operation of the emergency room to render it liable),
But see Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979) (state statute
requiring that every licensed general hospital provide a hospital emergency service not sufficient-
ly broad to impose upon the hospital the duty to assume responsibility for the practice of




The Ostensible or Apparent Agency Doctrine in Oklahoma
Two Oklahoma cases have considered the ostensible or apparent agency
theory as a method of imputing liability to a hospital for the negligence of in-
dependent ,ontractor/physicians in the emergency room setting. In the
earlier case, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals seemed willing to concede that
the apparent agency doctrine had some merit. In a later case, however, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the language of the earlier case but reached
a different result that turned on a preexisting doctor-patient relationship
where the patient looked to her family physician for treatment of her pro-
blem.
Weldon v. Seminole Municipal Hospital
Weldon involved an appeal from a district court decision granting a
hospital's motion for summary judgment in a negligence action against the
hospital and two doctors. 68 Jennifer Weldon, a minor, and her father,
Leonard Weldon, sought damages for injuries that resulted from the alleged
negligence of Dr. C. H. Price, Dr. Julian E. Wood, and Seminole Municipal
Hospital in the attempted removal of a bead from Jennifer's ear.69
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the district
court's ruling and stated that the hospital could not be held liable on the
facts under a theory of respondeat superior or ostensible agency for acts of
an independent contractor/physician. Nor could the supreme court find
evidence to support a finding that the hospital was liable for its own indepen-
dent acts of negligence.70
The appeflant was treated at Seminole Municipal Hospital for removal of a
bead lodged. in her ear. Aid was given by the Weldon's family physician, Dr.
Price, in the emergency room of the hospital. Dr. Wood happened to walk
by the emergency room and consulted with Dr. Price. Dr. Price tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to remove the bead. He then transferred the appellant to a hospital
in Oklahoma City where the bead was surgically removed.7 The appellant
sued the hospital, Dr. Price, and Dr. Wood to recover damages for the loss
of hearing in appellant's right ear.
72
The supreme court recognized that Oklahoma has joined those jurisdic-
tions that have allowed an exception to the general rule that a hospital cannot
be held liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor. This excep-
tion was established in Smith v. St. Francis Hospital when the Oklahoma
68. Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 703 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
69. Id. at 1060.
70. Id. at 1058.
71. Id. at 1059.
72. Appellant's brief set forth three propositions for the supreme court to consider. Proposi-
tion I asserted that the hospital's liability under a respondeat theory was a question of fact for
the jury. Proposition II stated that the hospital could be held liable under the "ostensible agent"
theory. Proposition III asserted that the hospital could be held liable for its own acts of
negligence under a corporate negligence theory. Brief for Appellant, Weldon v. Seminole Mun.
Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985).
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Court of Appeals set out the ostensible agency or agency by estoppel excep-
tion based on the absence of a preexisting doctor-patient relationship where
the patient looked to the hospital for treatment.1
3
The supreme court, however, restricted the application of this doctrine to
exclude situations where a patient contacts his physician first and the patient
has no reason to believe that the physician is acting on behalf of the hospital.
The Smith court concluded that where a hospital holds itself out as render-
ing emergency care and the patient reasonably relies on the hospital's
representation, the treating physicians are acting on behalf of the hospital
and the ostensible agency doctrine applies.7 ' The critical factor was the
absence of a preexisting relationship between the physician and the patient.
In Smith, the patient looked solely to and relied upon the hospital for his
treatment and had no reason to believe that the emergency room physicians
were acting on their own behalf."
Smith v. St. Francis Hospital
In Smith the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's summary
judgment in favor of a defendant hospital in a medical malpractice action.
76
Smith, the appellant, sought to recover damages for injuries allegedly sus-
tained as the result of misdiagnosis of appendicitis by an emergency room
physician. The appellant sued the hospital for the alleged negligence of the
emergency room physicians based on an apparent agency theory. The
hospital defended by renouncing any liability for the physicians based upon
the theory that the doctors were not employees, servants, or independent
contractors, but were employees of independent contractors.
77
The appellant was taken to the emergency room of St. Francis Hospital for
treatment of persistent pain in his stomach, groin, and leg. When appellant
arrived at the emergency room, his medical history was taken and appellant's
73. 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983). Oklahoma joined a growing list of jurisdictions that
apply the apparent agency doctrine so that a hospital can be held liable for the negligence of
physicians who are independent contractors. The test is whether the plaintiff, at the time of his
admission to the hospital, was looking to the hospital for treatment of his physical ailments, or
merely viewed the hospital as the situs where his physicians would treat him for his problems. Id.
at 282.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 283. See also Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972) (medical
center was liable for the negligence of a surgeon, an independent contractor, for injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff under the ostensible agent theory where the surgeon was referred to the plain-
tiff by the medical center, treatment took place at the center with the surgeon conducting himself
as a member of the staff, and plaintiff was billed on medical center stationery with surgeon's
name on it).
76. 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
77. Id. at 281. The appellant contended that the trial court erred when it released the hospital
from any responsibility for the alleged malpractice of its emergency room physicians. Id. at 280.
The lower court ruled that as a matter of law the emergency room physicians were not acting as
agents, servants, or employees of the hospital and dismissed the case against the hospital. On ap-
peal, the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the hospital was re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings. Id.
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mother advised hospital personnel that she believed her son had appendicitis.
Smith was examined by a physician after approximately six hours and sent
home.7" When his condition worsened the next day, appellant returned to the
emergency room where he was examined and sent home again. The ap-
pellant's appendix burst on the following day.
7 9
In order to determine whether the facts would support a finding of an
ostensible agency, the Smith court had to define the status of the physicians
who treated the patient in relation to the hospital. The court resolved the
issue by assuming, arguendo, that all the emergency personnel were indepen-
dent contractors. The court then stated that even if the personnel were in-
dependent contractors, the hospital was estopped from denying responsibility
for the negligence of its ostensible agents.8 0 This was true because the patient
"looked solely to and relied upon hospital for his treatment and was treated
by medical personnel regulated and authorized by the hospital to render
medical services in its emergency room, and because said personnel were
placed by hospital in a position of apparent authority to act on behalf of
hospital.""
78. Id. The appellant asserted that on his first trip to the emergency room he was examined
by Dr. Johns, Dr. Lockhart, and several interns and that Dr. Lockhart diagnosed his condition
as a spasmatic colon. Id.
79. Id. at 281. The hospital contended that Smith was examined by Dr. Lockhart on the sec-
ond visit who confirmed his diagnosis of spasmatic colon. The appellant's mother stated at trial
that her son was examined by a Dr. Burton. Id. at 280. On the third occasion Dr. Lockhart
diagnosed the appellant as suffering from acute appendicitis. Drs. Tommey and Lockhart
operated and the appellant remained in the hospital for ten days. Id. at 281.
80. Id. The court of appeals' finding with respect to Dr. Johns was that he was employed by
Emergency Care, Inc. (ECI), which was under contract to staff the emergency room. The court
looked to the terms of the contract to determine whether the hospital exercised control over these
contract physicians so as to create a principal-agent relationship. The court concluded that ECI
as well as the physicians were agents of the hospital. Id. The court never made a specific deter-
mination of the status of Dr. Lockhart, one of the physicians who examined and diagnosed the
patient. The hospital admitted that Lockhart was a staff physician but attempted to avoid liabil-
ity by claiming that the physician was a partner in Surgical Associates, Inc. (SAI). The court dis-
counted this logic "in the absence of any consensual relationship or contractual privilege be-
tween hospital and SAL. Dr. Lockhart was a staff physician who happened to be a partner in
SAL." Id. at 282. At this point in its decision, the court's analysis became unclear. The court,
without declaring whether Dr. Lockhart was an independent contractor or an employee, began
to discuss various theories of hospital liability with respect to the care provided by physicians.
The result is a mixture of the corporate liability theory and the ostensible agency doctrine. Id. at
281-82. See Southwick, Hospital Liability, Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEOAL MED.
1, 45-46 (1983) (no viable difference between doctrines of respondeat superior, ostensible agency,
and corporate negligence).
81. Smith, 576 P.2d at 282. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals' decision recognized a limita-
tion to the general rule that a hospital could not be held liable for the acts of independent
contractor-physicians. The court stated: "It is reasonable that patients entering a hospital
through its emerg.mcy room properly relied on the hospital's representation that the treating
doctors and staff of the emergency room were acting on behalf of the hospital and not as in-
dividuals." Id. at 282. The court relied in part on the RESTATEMEmr (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 429
(1966), which provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which
are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the
[Vol. 40
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Finally, the court of appeals adopted the test established in Grewe v. Mt.
Clements General Hospital, which stated, "the critical question is whether
the patient looked to the hospital for treatment or merely viewed the hospital
as the situs where the physician would treat him for his problems." 82
The Smith court was cognizant of the changing role of hospitals in our
society. Hospitals serve as providers of medical care and treatment in addi-
tion to serving as a situs for treatment of patients by independent contrac-
tors. If a hospital does not take positive steps to put the patient on notice,
the Smith decision would arguably allow a patient to assume that all medical
personnel who treat him are acting on behalf of the hospital.
An Analysis of the Oklahoma Court Decisions
Weldon may be distinguished from Smith because there was a preexisting
relationship and thus no basis for believing that the doctor was acting on
behalf of the hospital. 83 Most courts still refuse to impose vicarious liability
on a hospital where the patient contacts his personal physician and the doctor
employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the
negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as
though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.
See also Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985) (hospital could be held liable
on principles of ostensible agency for negligence of physicians who furnished treatment to pa-
tients in emergency room provided by the hospital and open to public, notwithstanding that
physician was not actually employed by hospital); Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich.
240, 273 N.W.2d 429 (1978) (even where the physician is an independent contractor not subject
to the hospital's control, that fact "is not of critical importance to the patient who is the
ultimate victim of that physician's malpractice"); Cooper v. Curry, 92 N.M. 417, 589 P.2d 201
(1978) (rule of nonliability is out of tune with life about us, and a hospital should be liable for
the malpractice of a surgeon whether he is an agent or an independent contractor; distinction be-
tween independent contractor and agent does not realistically reflect the symbiotic relationship
between a hospital and its medical staff). But see Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669 (8th
Cir. 1985) (hospital patient's subjective assumption that emergency room doctor was an
employee of the hospital was insufficient under Missouri law to create an ostensible agency).
82. 404 Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (1978). The Grewe test represents a departure from
the traditional view that a hospital is not vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician who
is an independent contractor and only uses the hospital's facilities to treat his patients with
whom he has a preexisting relationship. See also Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279
(Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (hospital was estopped from denying responsibility for the negligence of
its ostensible agents).
Consequently, the hospital must be held accountable for the negligence, if any, of
its authorized emergency room physicians regardless of whether or not he is an in-
dependent contractor by secret limitation contained in private contract between the
hospital and doctor or by virtue of some other business relationship unknown to
the patient and contrary to the hospital's conduct and representation.
Id. at 283.
83. Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Okla. 1985). The state supreme
court stated that unlike the patient in Smith, the patient in Weldon did have a preexisting rela-
tionship with the treating physician. Factors to establish this relationship were that Jennifer
Weldon's mother called Dr. Price at home seeking help, the Weldons were not looking to the
hospital to provide medical care, and the hospital merely provided its facilities. Id.
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bills the patient directly." Under the Weldon analysis, the general test will be
whether the patient looked to the hospital for treatment or merely viewed the
hospital as a place where his personal physician would treat him for his pro-
blem.85
In restricting the ostensible agency theory to instances where no preexisting
relationship with the treating doctor exists, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
would exclude some cases that should properly be ostensible agency cases.
The critical question should be whether the patient reasonably believes that
his doctor is acting as an agent of the hospital when he is working at the
hospital.
If the patient in some vague way knows that the treating doctor is on the
staff of the hospital and is on call at the emergency room, the patient might
reasonably believe that his doctor is acting on behalf of the hospital. Even if
the doctor bills the patient, the patient might think that the hospital has a
relationship with his doctor that causes the doctor to act on the hospital's
behalf.
If the Weldon court had followed the Smith analysis, it might have found
that a question of fact existed as to whether an ostensible agency relationship
had been created and that the issue should have been a matter for the jury's
determination. The court could have found that the hospital held Dr. Price
out as its agent by providing emergency room care and failing to advise the
Weldons that Jennifer was not being treated by the hospital's agents." The
thrust of the ostensible agency doctrine requires the court to ask whether the
hospital has cloaked the staff physician with the appearance of acting on the
hospital's behalf so that the patient, in good faith, believes that the physician
is an agent. 7 As stated in Smith, "[M]embers of the public who avail
themselves oF a hospital's emergency room services . . . have a right to expect
competent medical treatment from the medical personnel." ' ,
Dr. Price, the physician in Weldon, possessed staff privileges at the
hospital and was furnished a rent-free medical office, a rent-free home for
his personal use, three meals a day at no cost, and a laboratory. 89 Dr. Price
may have treated all of his patients in the office provided by the hospital and
probably submitted much of his laboratory work to the hospital facilities.
Although the facts do not indicate how the hospital emergency room was
staffed, it might be assumed, given its size and location, that Dr. Price
worked in the emergency room on occasion. Because of his close association
with the hospital, the Weldons may have been justified in believing that the
physician was an agent of the hospital.
84. See Annotation, Later Case Service, 69 A.L.R.2d 305 (1984).
85. Weldon, 769 P.2d at 1060.
86. See Brief for Appellant, Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1985).
87. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency §§ 78-81 (1986). But see Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d
669 (8th Cir. 1984) (mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party believes to be
the hospital's servant is not sufficient to cause apparent master to be liable).
88. Smith, 676 P.2d at 282.
89. Weldon, 7C9 P.2d at 1060.
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The Weldons were not obligated to inquire whether each person who
assisted in the emergency room was a paid employee of the hospital. 90 Nor do
the facts indicate that the hospital took any affirmative steps to inform the
Weldons that Dr. Price was not its agent-no signs were posted, no written
acknowledgment was advanced, no verbal statements were given.
Bing v. Thunig9 ' stressed that hospitals are more than just places for physi-
cians to bring their patients for treatment:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses,
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their
own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day
hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do
far more than furnish facilities for treatment .... Certainly, the
person who avails himself of hospital facilities expects that the
hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other
employees will act on their own responsibility.
92
The supreme court in Weldon followed the rationale of the Washington
Court of Appeals in adopting a formula to determine when to hold hospitals
liable for the negligence of staff physicians. 93 Adamski v. Tacoma General
Hospital established a two-part test: (1) whether the patient sought treatment
primarily from the hospital, and (2) whether the hospital paid the doctor a
salary.94 The Smith court only questions whether the plaintiff, at the time of
admission, looked to the hospital for treatment or simply saw the hospital as
the place where his physician would treat him. 9S Further, the Smith analysis
does not make payment of the physician's salary by the hospital a necessary
requisite to impose liability.
The existence of an ostensible agency depends on whether the patient
believes that the treating physician is an agent of the hospital. This belief is
90. See Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App. 2d 141, 128 P.2d 705
(1942) (in finding an ostensible agency the court asserted that it could not be contended that
respondent, when he was being carried from room to room suffering excruciating pain, should
have to inquire whether the individual doctors were employees or independent contractors); Ar-
thur v. St. Peter's Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979) (patients have the right to
assume that emergency room physicians are employees of the hospital); Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp.,
107 A.D.2d 557, 483 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1985) (where patient entered clinic for medical treatment
and the clinic undertook to treat patient and furnished doctors, patient could properly assume
that treating doctors and staff were acting on behalf of clinic).
91. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
92. 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 267 comment
a (1958) states: "The mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party believes to be
the defendant's servant is not sufficient to cause the apparent master to be liable. There must be
such reliance upon the manifestation as exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct."
93. Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970, 975 (1978). This for-
mula was first applied in Brown v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 138 Cal. 475,
71 P. 516 (1903).
94. Adamski, 579 P.2d at 975.




generally fo-rmed when a hospital holds itself out to the public as providing
emergency room services and the patient relies on the hospital to deliver care
and treatment. Unless the hospital takes steps to put the patient on notice
that the emergency room physician is not acting on behalf of the hospital, the
patient is justified in believing the physician to be the hospital's agent.
Logically then, whether the hospital paid the physician a salary should be ir-
relevant in finding an ostensible agency unless the patient knew the salary
was being paid.
With respect to the plaintiff's corporate negligence theory in Weldon, the
supreme court emphasized that the corporate negligence doctrine does not
apply where the patient has not yet been admitted to the hospital.' 6 The court
did not discuss that factor in rejecting plaintiff's ostensible agency theory.
But even where the plaintiff is not yet admitted, he could reasonably think
that his doctor is working on behalf of the hospital if the doctor is making
the decision whether to admit the patient.
The Unanswered Questions
One problem associated with applying the ostensible agency doctrine to
hospital emergency room situations is proving patient reliance as a result of
the hospital's holding out of the physician as its agent. Theoretically, in
order to establish an ostensible agency, evidence must be introduced that
shows the patient relied on the representation of the hospital. This evidence
must also indicate that the patient changed his position and will suffer loss if
the physician's acts do not bind the hospital.' 7
Neither the court of appeals in Smith nor the supreme court in Weldon
reached this issue. The obvious difficulty associated with proving a patient's
reliance is that the evidence will almost always center on the patient's own
testimony. It i:s questionable how objective or truthful a patient will be if he
has been permanently impaired as a result of the physician's alleged
negligence.
Another question courts have difficulty in answering is how a hospital can
intentionally represent to a patient that a physician is the hospital's agent,
hence inducing patient reliance. The Restatement (Second) of Agency states
that "the manifestation of a principal may be made to the community by
96. Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Okla. 1985).
97. See Szlorc v. Northwest Hosp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 275, 496 N.E.2d 1200 (1986). The court
considered whether patient reliance as a requirement for ostensible agency should be strictly en-
forced. The hospital tried to prove, through the plaintiff's own testimony, that she was unable to
confirm that it would have made a difference in her decision to receive treatment if she had
known whether the physicians were independent contractors or employees. The court held that a
triable issue of fact existed and remanded to the trial court. 496 N.E.2d at 1202. But see Porter
v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1984) (in order to prove reliance on the skill or
care of an apparent agent, the patient would have to present evidence that his decision to allow a
physician to perform surgery on him was made because he believed the doctor was an agent of
the defendant hos;pital).
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signs, by advertising, by authorizing the agent to state that he is authorized,
or by continuously employing the agent." 9
Because of the public's perception of the role of the hospital as a provider
of emergency care, the hospital will probably have to take affirmative steps
to inform the patient that the treating physician is an independent contractor
for whom the hospital will assume no liability. Even then it is arguable that
the ostensible agency doctrine might still apply under the test recognized by
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals and the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The use of emergency rooms in hospitals for emergent and nonemergent
care has increased dramatically and shows no signs of abating. Because
hospitals use a variety of staffing procedures for the emergency room, the
application of principles of vicarious liability in this context will be a contin-
uing source of litigation. In each case the court will have to analyze the facts
to determine whether ostensible agency principles apply. These facts,
however, should always be balanced with the hospital's responsibility to pro-
vide appropriate staff and facilities for emergency care where the hospital has
undertaken to render such care to the public.
Julia A. Bailey
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 8 comment b (1958). See also Paintsville Hosp. Co.
v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985), where the court stated that the cases applying the ostensible
agency doctrine do not require an express representation to the patient that the physician is an
employee of the hospital nor do they require direct testimony as to reliance. A general represent-
ation is implied from the circumstances. Id. at 256.
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